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Social and economic planning in Appalachia
has long been prefaced on the assumption that
the region is a poverty-stricken subculture of
the greater, more affluent nation. As urbani-
zation and industrialization have provided for
the wieldy development of the greater nation, so
the thinking has been, the same process could
likewise enrich Appalachia. Trapped in this
mindset, posits Whisnant in Modernizing the
Mountaineer
,
planners launched an urban-
industrial campaign for this 'backward area'
predicated on inappropriate and unexamined
assumptions. Failing to recognize the con-
sequences of discounting socio-cultural unique-
ness, planners instinctively prescribed the
urban-industrial development model as a cure for
the lagging economy.
Each of the three main sections of the book
addresses a particular application of this re-
gional development model. Part I examines the
Council of Southern Mountains, an 'umbrella'
organization for non-secular Appalachian devel-
opment. Parts II and III analyze federal and
state/sub-state programs, respectively. Through
case studies , Whisnant traces for the reader the
evolution of planning in Appalachia.
rapidly than in the area outside: The early
years of the agency offered great promise.
Beginning in the 1960s, fed by a growing
cry for government accountability to the people,
the political, social, and resource policies of
TVA were subjected to heavy questioning. In
weighing costs against benefits many critics
charged that the program had lost touch with its
mission. To meet escalating power demands TVA
had turned from hydropower development to produ-
cing electricity through coal-fired generating
plants. In so doing, TVA pursued aggressive and
destructive policies on strip-mining.
By 1968, TVA had relocated in excess of
125,000 people, condemned 2 million acres of
land for hydropower generation, and acquired
more than 375 million tons of coal reserves.
Purchasing coal "in quantity and on a long-terra
contractual basis from non-union stripmiues ," TVA
radically altered the structure of the coal
industry in Appalachia. TVA's coal-buying pol-
icies led to further anti-competitive integra-
tion of the industry, cites Whisnant, as large
companies that opened stripmines to fill TVA
contracts "were owned and operated by multina-
tional energy conglomerates."
THE VISIONS OF ASSIMILATION
Introduced in 1933 as a project that
"touches and gives life to all forms of human
concern" and provides "a picture of the world as
it might be", the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) was celebrated as the most idealistic and
comprehensive planning effort attempted to date
in the United States. Claiming that "what God
had made one, man was to develop as one, "
Director David E. Lilienthal envisioned a uni-
fied regional development which would treat
widespread economic and social problems and
integrate natural resource use to the develop-
ment effort.
During its first two decades TVA tamed 650
miles of the flood prone Tenessee River and its
tributaries, built 20 dams, reforested 800,000
acres, and aided more than 68,0 00 farmers in
developing methods of advanced technology farm-
ing. In a nation hard-hit by the Depression,
employment increased in the valley 20% more
As criticism of TVA escalated, the federal
government instituted major new development pro-
grams to redirect this negative attention.
Passed on May 1, 1961 the Area Redevelopment Act
(ARA) authorized millions of dollars to be spent
in the depressed coal-counties of Appalachia for
industrial loans, public facilities, technical
assistance programs, and job training. It was
the first in a succession of federal-community
partnerships that 'guaranteed' to modify re-
gional unemployment.
Whisnant traces the rapid demise of this
program to its partnership nature. "For ARA to
work, a number of assumptions had to prove
tenable: that the necessary jobs should be
generated in the private rather than the public
sector; ...that the 'private sector' would and
could create jobs at a justifiable cost; and
that the direct benefits to the entrepreneurs
who would receive most of the federal money
would in fact 'trickle down' to the unem-
ployed. "
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The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 in-
augurated the War on Poverty in the region.
Conceived of by John Kennedy and carried out by
Lyndon Johnson, the "hodge-podge of a poverty
poultice" suffered weeks in congressional and
task force debate which severely weakened the
unified strength of the original plan. Refusing
to acknowledge that the corporate monopolization
of resources that had gradually taken place over
the 'development' years in Appalachia had con-
tributed to regional poverty and unemployment,
the Johnson Administration designed a program
that had little hope of success. "Poverty was
to be eliminated by reinforcing and extrapo-
lating the system whose irrational and inequi-
table operation had destroyed the region in the
first place."
As a logical outgrowth of this War on
Poverty, the Appalachian Regional Commission
(ARC) was plagued by the same ills as previous
programs. In signing the act in 1964 President
Johnson called it "the truest example of crea-
tive federalism in our time." Whisnant claims,
however, that it was much less than creative in
its approach to development. The program failed
to address the region's most critical needs:
unemployment, the proliferation of low-wage in-
dustry, absentee ownership, inequitable taxa-
tion, and lack of essential human services. The
focus of ARC was, instead, to complete a highway
corridor system, to encourage further industrial
development, and to sponsor the building of
non-controversial vocational education schools.
At the same time, ARC portrayed to the "rest of
the world" a vision of the Appalachian people as
"quaint cultural anachronisms, insulated by
pride from the realities of modern life."
In the years following its inception in
1913, the Council of Southern Mountains assumed
a certain preeminence in Appalachia. From its
headquarters at a small Kentucky college, the
Council served as a forum for some limited
debate concerning policies for regional develop-
ment, yet prescribed policies disappointingly
shallow. Reflecting the administration's views
and those of conservative missionaries, claims
Whisnant, the Council broached programs for
Appalachia which were paternalistic and forged
to cosmetically treat the regional problems. It
called for "god fearing homes; agriculture
fitted to the mountains; better roads, schools,
and recreational opportunities; and stronger
churches .
"
to help develop a regional consciousness which
might aid in returning control of Appalachia to
its own residents. A major initial goal was the
fabrication of development strategies which
would avoid the tendency to assimilate mountain
culture to that of mainstream America.
To what degree this regional consciousness,
self-control, and local development strategies
have materialized is in question. Subject to
staff disagreements, budget constraints, and an
environment largely controlled by non-poor, non-
resident, and non-working class people, the
Council "has been largely an anachronism during
its final decade." Interest, cites Whisnant,
had shifted to single issue-oriented groups at
the community level, and to federal programs on
the regional scale.
Whisnant comes finally to conclude that
regional development is best practiced as pro-
ceeding from cultural conservation as funda-
mentally as from technical enterprise. Debates,
he claims, over the technical details of devel-
opment theory and practice are at most secondary
to an understanding of the deeply rooted spirit-
ual, psychic, and cultural values of each
region.
Throughout the book Whisnant has sought to
illustrate Appalachian developers as extenders
of mainstream American culture. By turning only
to the culture external to the region as a
yardstick by which to measure program success,
these planners failed to address local needs and
to respect a local cultural tradition. The
failure of program after program which sought to
industrialize and urbanize Appalachia speaks to
the inappropriateness of the model's application
to this culturally distinct region.
The implications for future planners in the
region are not obvious: what Whisnant fails to
offer is a viable alternative to this model. He
critically and comprehensively examines each
development program, but evidences no creative
response to the problems identified and agreed
upon. Perhaps these 'problems' are, as he
maintains, symptomatic of the uneven capital-
istic development of Appalachia. If so, and if
we will, as he claims in summary, "ultimately
get only the kind of development allowed by our
level of cultural sensitivity, sanctioned by our
values, demanded by our ethics," what will that
be?
By 1960 the Council was heavily criticized
for its development policies. Sandwiched be-
tween its traditional belief in missionary poli-
tics and a need to respond to such controversial
issues as resource exploitation, housing short-
ages, and rising unemployment. Council members
concluded that relocation was imperative. The
move to the coalfields of Dickenson County,
Virginia stemmed from a perceived need to be
closer to the problems besetting the region and
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